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The United States and the Republic of the Philippines maintain a “special 
relationship” that can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th Century.  During 
this period, the US has played a significant role in the development of the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to what it is today.  This thesis assesses the 
scope of US influence in shaping military professionalism in the Philippines. 
Maintaining military professionalism in the AFP is fundamental in keeping 
positive civil-military relations in the country.  As an essential element in 
sustaining democracy, military professionalism directly impacts the status of US-
Philippines bilateral relations and ensures the advancement of the 1951 Mutual 
Defense Treaty (MDT) objectives.   
This thesis analyzes several areas wherein the US has potentially played 
a role in influencing military professionalism, namely the Philippine Military 
Academy (PMA), attendance of Philippine cadets at US service academies, 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, and US-Philippines 
Mil-to-Mil exercises.  In addition, this study also discusses the degree of US 
influence as the AFP deals with the Post-Cold War era, the new roles and 
missions related to the postmodern military, the Revolution in Military Affairs, and 
the US-led global war on terrorism. 
Finally, this thesis presents a case study of the July 2003 failed mutiny 
that involved a number of junior officers.  The study proposes that professional-
ism, or the lack thereof, is not an independent variable that determines whether 
or not the military will intervene in political affairs.  Instead, it is a combination of 
strong civilian institutions, an effective and efficient military institution, solid 
oversight mechanisms, and highly professional armed forces that will preclude 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE  
The objective of this thesis is to assess the scope of US influence in 
shaping military professionalism in the Philippines. 
 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The professional character of the Philippine officer corps may be defined 
within the framework of Samuel Huntington’s concept of the military professional.  
Huntington explains the three distinguishing characteristics of the professional 
officer:  expertise, social responsibility, and corporateness.1  Maintaining military 
professionalism in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is fundamental in 
keeping positive civil-military relations in the country.  As an essential element in 
sustaining democracy, military professionalism directly impacts the status of US-
Philippines bilateral relations and ensures the advancement of the 1951 Mutual 
Defense Treaty (MDT) objectives.  This thesis assesses the current status of 
military professionalism in the Philippines and recommends how the US can 
exert a positive influence to enhance civil-military relations. 
 
C. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT 
Where does the US influence begin and how did military professionalism 
in the Philippines evolve?    This thesis explores the “special relations” between 
the US and the Philippines since the colonial period and focuses on how the US 
has played a role in influencing military professionalism.   While tracing this 
special relationship, this thesis highlights the evolution of professionalism in the 
Philippine officer corps. 
This study analyzes several areas wherein the US has potentially played a 
role in influencing military professionalism.  One of the areas of possible US 
influence concerns the composition of the curriculum at the Philippine Military 
                                            
1 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State:  The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 11. 
1 
Academy (PMA) and how much of it is patterned on the US in the area of 
professionalism.   A second possible influence is the attendance of Philippine 
cadets at the US service academies.  What is the impact of US-produced 
graduates and their role in military professionalism? 
Another key US influence that this thesis explores is the Philippine 
participation in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.  
While this program is diverse in its approach to provide training to students from 
allied and friendly nations, one of the examples underscored by IMET in 
supporting regional stability and democracy goals is “increased evidence and 
demonstration of militaries promoting civilian control of the military, improved 
civil-military relations, and support for democratization.”2  In gauging US 
influence, this thesis studies the extent of Philippine participation in IMET and 
traces the participants who have advanced to fill prominent positions in the AFP 
or in the civilian government. 
A fourth possible influence, which is discussed in this study, is the role of 
the joint mil-to-mil exercise.  As part of the US-Philippines bilateral relations, 
these exercises continue to provide a unique training environment for both armed 
forces.  What is the impact of these exercises on military professionalism and 
civil-military relations? 
The non-renewal of US bases in the Philippines and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union have also reshaped US-Philippine relations.  These events have 
changed the security environment in the country and have forced the AFP to 
reevaluate its capability to fulfill its roles and missions as it confronts the 
challenges of the 21st Century.  Furthermore, the US-led global war on terrorism 
has also placed the Philippines at the forefront of the counter-terrorism campaign 
in Southeast Asia.  These appear to be significant areas of US influence 
particularly in the equipping and training of the AFP through cooperative efforts 
under the MDT. 
                                            
2 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2001, Military 




Did the US positively influence military professionalism in the Philippines?  
While measuring US influence is difficult, this study tests the hypothesis that, 
overall, the US has positively influenced military professionalism in the 
Philippines.  Furthermore, this study identifies other opportunities in which the 
two countries can cooperate to enhance civil-military relations.  
 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The primary methodology used in this thesis is to gather empirical 
evidence of US influence on military professionalism based on previous studies 
and publications examine Philippine civil-military experience.   The analytical 
framework identifies the roles of key positions and leaders, both civilian and 
military, as actors in the Philippine civil-military experience.   Additionally, the 
level of analysis also includes the decision making process in which the civilian 
and military elites are involved, particularly in regards to the US-Philippines 
relations. 
This research involves a review of the curriculum at the PMA dealing with 
military professionalism during the formative years of a Philippine officer.   
Personal interviews with faculty members or previous cadets are conducted to 
analyze the extent of US influence in the curriculum.  This research also 
evaluates the impact of Philippine attendance and participation at US service 
academies and IMET in the AFP. 
While considering Huntington’s characteristics of the military professional, 
this thesis uses three basic criteria to assess military professionalism in the AFP.  
First, it considers the military’s commitment to the supremacy of civilian authority.  
Secondly, it evaluates the AFP’s success in meeting its training objectives, which 
translates to the expertise of the officer corps.  Lastly, it evaluates the AFP officer 
corps’ unity as a professional entity and a bureaucratic organization.  
 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II defines the model of military professionalism in the AFP using 
Huntington’s model as a framework.  While the Philippine model subscribes to 
3 
the view of professionalism with the acceptance of and subordination to civilian 
authority, the Philippine experience reflects that this model was challenged 
during the Marcos and succeeding regimes.  During the Aquino presidency, coup 
attempts became a common occurrence in Philippine civil-military relations.  The 
military leadership also played a key role in the ousting of President Estrada 
amidst corruption allegations. In July 2003, a group of junior officers perpetrated 
a failed mutiny once again bringing into question the issue of corruption at the 
highest levels of government, including the military. Is there perhaps a unique 
model for the Philippines?  
To provide a foundation of the Philippine model of professionalism, this 
chapter traces the evolution of military professionalism for the past century and 
highlights the US influence.   This section will present an overview of US-
Philippines relations since July 4, 1902, when President Theodore Roosevelt 
declared the end of the Philippine War and the US Congress passed the “organic 
act” law governing the Philippines.   The role of politics is also discussed and 
shows how the regime in power may have altered the course of military 
professionalism. 
Chapter III discusses four areas in which the US has possibly influenced 
military professionalism.  As the premier military institution, PMA inculcates 
professionalism in future officers in the AFP.  This research assesses PMA’s 
curriculum in military professionalism and determines the extent of US influence.  
This chapter also traces Philippine graduates of US service academies and 
assesses their role in shaping military professionalism.   Philippine participation 
in the IMET program is also discussed to evaluate the success of the program in 
influencing military professionalism.  A fourth area of US influence concerns joint 
mil-to-mil exercises being conducted under US-Philippines bilateral relations.  
Each area is evaluated whether or not it has positively influenced military 
professionalism in the AFP. 
Critical to the AFP’s ability to fulfill its roles and missions in the 21st 
Century is how it transforms itself while maintaining viability. Chapter IV 
examines three issues affecting military professionalism.  First, the changing 
4 
security environment and the war on terrorism have forced the AFP to reevaluate 
its current capabilities and work more closely with the US in the global war on 
terrorism.  Secondly, and in light of this new security environment, the AFP is 
confronted with the concepts of the postmodern military and the Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA). 
Finally, Chapter V presents a case study of the July 2003 botched mutiny 
led by a group of junior officers.  The adventurism displayed by 323 officers and 
enlisted men presents an interesting test of professionalism in the AFP.  This 
event challenged the legitimacy of the government and highlighted the persistent 
problem of graft and corruption in the country.  Is this a case of a breakdown in 
democracy or simply a lapse in military leadership?  This case study examines 
the events leading to the mutiny and the complaints the rebellious soldiers have 
levied against the Arroyo administration and the AFP leadership.  Additionally, 
this chapter analyzes the government’s response to the mutiny and the claim of a 
larger conspiracy involving other political actors within the Philippine government.  
More importantly, this case study evaluates the current state of professionalism 








































II. THE PHILIPPINE MODEL OF PROFESSIONALISM 
A. DEFINING MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM 
The professional character of the Philippine officer corps may be defined 
within the framework of Samuel Huntington’s concept of the military professional.  
Huntington explains the three distinguishing characteristics of the professional 
officer:  expertise, social responsibility, and corporateness.3   He further argues 
that objective civilian control of the military – militarizing the military and making 
them a tool of the state – maximizes military professionalism.4  As a Third World 
country, however, the Philippine experience shows with empirical evidence that 
there is a continuing trend of military “civilianization” and civil “militarization.”   
During the Marcos and Aquino regimes, for example, the professionalism of the 
armed forces came into question when coup attempts became a common 
occurrence in Philippine civil-military relations.   
The expertise of the Philippine officer begins at PMA where the character 
of the officer corps is inculcated in every cadet.  The Academy’s four pillars of 
cadet development – leadership and character development; broad and basic 
military skills; liberal education in the arts and sciences; and, physical fitness –  
blends intellectual, military professional, physical, and character aspects of 
training to mold future officers of the AFP.5  The curriculum at PMA is designed 
to prepare young cadets to become leaders in the profession of arms – their first 
steps in acquiring the competence to “manage violence.”  After graduation from 
PMA, new officers advance to their chosen branch of service where they begin 
their progression in their career specialization.  
The social responsibility of the Philippine officer corps is defined by its role 
in protecting society and state.   Huntington prescribes that a professional military 
                                            
3 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State:  The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 11. 
4 Ibid., p. 83. 
5 PMA Curriculum, Four Pillars of Cadet Development, 
<http://www.pma.ph/curriculum/Curriculum.htm> (3 March 2003) 
7 
is “monopolized by the state.”6  The Philippine Constitution is very explicit in 
defining the role of the AFP as “the protector of the people and the State” and 
provides that “civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.”7  
Furthermore, the Constitution also states that “professionalism in the armed 
forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its members shall be a prime 
concern of the State” and insulates the military from politicization prohibiting 
political engagement by the military, directly or indirectly, except to vote.8   
The corporate character of the Philippine military can be found by tracing 
the professional bonding of officers which begins at PMA and is strengthened as 
each graduating class assumes its responsibilities in the AFP.  There is a certain 
prestige that follows every graduate because, unlike in the US, PMA is the only 
military academy in the Philippines for all branches of service, but the shared 
experience of each PMA class captures the essence of corporateness in the 
AFP.  McCoy describes this distinctiveness of PMA graduates while comparing 
the socialization of two generations of PMA graduating classes.  He observes 
that “the collective persona of every PMA class is shaped by a central paradox:  
each is identical yet unique.”9 
With the expansion of the AFP’s mission and roles, the Philippine model of 
professionalism goes beyond Huntington’s framework of the military professional 
and objective civilian control.  The AFP’s role in Civil-Military Operations (CMO) , 
for example, has immersed the military in local politics while dealing with 
insurgencies.  Besides its function in economic development through CMOs, the 
AFP has also been tasked to augment local law enforcement to deal with the 
rash of kidnappings, especially in the Metro Manila area.  Furthermore, the 
military has been involved in peacekeeping or peace-building operations such as 
those in East Timor, Iraq, and Liberia.  Thus, the Philippine model subscribes to 
                                            
6 Huntington, p.15. 
7 Constitution of the Philippines, Article II, Section 3. 
8 Constitution of the Philippines, Article 16, General Provisions, Section 5(3). 
9 Alfred W. McCoy, Closer Than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy (New 
Haven:  Yale University Press, 1999), p. 6. 
8 
Alred Stepan’s “new professionalism” that politicizes the military and encourages 
role expansion. 
 
B. THE EVOLUTION OF PROFESSIONALISM IN THE AFP 
This section presents a brief overview of the evolution of military 
professionalism for the past century.   In order to highlight the areas of US 
influence from a historical perspective, this research presents particular events of 
US-Philippines relations since July 4, 1902, when President Theodore Roosevelt 
declared the end of the Philippine War, and the US the Congress passed the 
“organic act” law governing the Philippines.10   It is interesting to note the role of 
politics and the actions of certain political and military elites during successive 
regimes and how their decisions may have shaped military professionalism 
unique to the Philippines, yet with a distinct US influence. 
 
1. US Colonial Period 
During the Philippine-American War, the US laid the foundation for a 
modern Philippine military by recruiting “native” soldiers to serve as scouts and 
interpreters and later to be inducted by the US Army as part of the Philippine 
Scouts.11  The initial force structure, however, did not allow for Filipinos to serve 
in leadership positions because General Elwell Otis, the American Commander 
at that time, considered even the Filipino elites “unfit for command.”12 But that 
would change as America’s “native” regiments would soon play a substantial role 
in the ongoing pacification as part of the Philippine Scouts and the Philippine 
Constabulary, which later included a minority of Filipino officers.   
During the First World War, the number of Filipino officers began to 
increase when over a hundred American officers resigned to join the war efforts 
in Europe.13  The increase in “native” officers can be directly attributed to the 
                                            
10 Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines (New York:  Random 
House, Inc., 1989), p. 436. 
11 McCoy, p. 16. 
12 McCoy, p. 18. 
13 Ibid., p. 19. 
9 
“Filipinization” policy in 1916 when the Philippine legislature cut pay for colonial 
officers and began to train Filipinos at the expanded Constabulary Academy at 
Baguio.14  A significant milestone in the rise of Filipino officers was the 
appointment of General Rafael Crame as chief of constabulary.  During his 
command, the constabulary regiment was transformed into an all-Filipino 
professional force.15  Also discussed later in this paper is the entry of Filipino 
cadets into the US service academies. 
During the 1920s, the American colonial regime started training Filipino 
officers for command mobilizing the US Army to conduct officer training programs 
at Manila’s leading colleges, which was the beginning of the Reserve Officers’ 
Training Corps (ROTC).16  At the University of the Philippines, for example, an 
active-duty US Army captain was retained as chairman of the Department of 
Military Science and Tactics.17 
On March 1934, the US Congress passed the Tydings-McDuffie Act 
mandating a ten-year transition toward Philippine independence.18  Later that 
year Manuel Quezon, expecting to preside over the newly created Philippine 
commonwealth, invited General Douglas MacArthur to become the principal 
military adviser.19  By this time, Japan was expanding in China and the threat of 
an invasion was real if not inevitable. Faced with the critical question of Philippine 
national defense, General MacArthur proposed “a reserve of citizen conscripts, 
trained and commanded by a core of regulars, to be mobilized in the event of 
war.”20 
Following his election as president of the Philippine commonwealth, 
Quezon made mobilization his top priority under the National Defense Act of 
                                            
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., p. 21. 
17 McCoy, p. 21. 
18 Karnow, p. 437. 
19 Ibid., p. 270. 
20 Ibid. 
10 
1935.21  General MacArthur and his staff officers, Dwight Eisenhower and James 
Ord, prepared the Swiss plan for the defense of the islands using an army of 
citizen-soldiers.22  Due to budgetary constraints, training for conscripts was 
trimmed down to six months, military pay was reduced, and the purchase of new 
weapons was eliminated.23  As military training was set in motion, the Philippine 
Army was faced with the dilemma of forming an officer corps not only because of 
the length of time it would take to educate an officer (four years) but also the lack 
of officers to train.  Training conscripts, on the other hand, only required six 
months. 
By necessity, the Philippine Army formed its officer corps from the few 
West Point graduates, veterans from the constabulary and Philippine Scouts, and 
a large number of college reservists.24  Before the outbreak of war in the Pacific, 
the Philippine Army had 770 regular and reserve forces including the first 
graduates from PMA.25  This might have been one of the main turning points in 
the evolution of military professionalism in the Philippine armed forces.  McCoy 
makes a very interesting contrast between PMA graduates and those reserve 
officers from the University of the Philippines (UP).26  On the one hand, the PMA 
graduates in that generation were indoctrinated into an ideal of military 
professionalism, one that submitted to civil supremacy.  On the other hand, UP 
ROTC graduates who emerged from activist and nationalist sentiments, had 
values that sought to politicize the military, serving both nation and personal 
ambition.  Notable UP reserve officer figures McCoy sites include key individuals 
in the martial law regime:  President Ferdinand Marcos, his chief of staff Romeo 
                                            
21 McCoy, p. 23. 
22 H. W. Brands, Bound to Empire:  The United States and the Philippines (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 1992), p. 167. 
23 Ibid. 
24 McCoy, p. 24. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., p. 25. 
11 
Espino, Supreme Court Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, and sugar czar Roberto 
S. Benedicto.27  
During the war, the Philippine Army was integrated with the United States 
Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE).28  The Philippine forces were comprised 
of 100,000 active forces in the Philippine Army plus 12,000 Philippine Scouts.29  
These forces, alongside their American protectors, fought Japanese invaders in 
Bataan, engaged in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare, and participated in the 
battles for Philippine liberation. 
 
2. Post-colonial Period 
The declaration of Philippine independence on July 4, 1946, although it 
marked the end of colonialism, did not end the country’s dependence on the 
United States.  After the war, the Philippines had three overriding issues:  
economy, US relations, and the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon 
(Hukbalahap).30  Once again, the country had to rely on American support to 
establish its armed forces.  Washington’s influence would become apparent as it 
decided AFP’s mission to be that of internal defense and integrated the 
Philippines into the American global system, which guaranteed its strategic 
defense.31  This not only denied the AFP its responsibility of external defense but 
also “planted seeds of an ideological crisis for Filipino officers.”32 
The US would also play its hand in influencing the rise of Ramon 
Magsaysay in the early 1950s.  Under Quirino’s regime, he became secretary of 
defense at the “insistence of the United States.”33  During this period, 
government corruption was already rampant while the military faced morale and 
                                            
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., p. 26. 
29 H. W. Brands, p. 188. 
30 David Steinberg, The Philippines:  A Singular and a Plural Place (Boulder:  Westview Press, 
Inc., 1990), p.  107. 
31 McCoy, pp. 26-27. 
32 Ibid., p. 27. 
33 Steinberg, p. 109. 
12 
training problems and could not overcome the Hukbalahap insurgency. 34  
Magsaysay, through his close ties to the Americans, revitalized the AFP, 
resolved the Hukbalahap insurgency, and restored fair congressional elections in 
1951.35   Magsaysay’s impact on civil-military relations, while restoring the 
integrity of the AFP, also had a negative implication.  Serving as both President 
and Secretary of Defense, he engaged the officer corps in civil administration 
thus injecting the element of political tension within the AFP.36   
In the decade following Magsaysay’s regime, the armed forces remained 
the same and was comprised of approximately 58,000 multiservice force.37  
McCoy describes the professionalism of the post-war officers leading the AFP as 
“indoctrinated into an ideal of civilian supremacy and generally avoided political 
entanglements … an elite apart from the pervasive politics of their society.”38  He 
adds, however, that because of budget constraints and slow promotions, some 
officers resorted to corruption and political patronage.39  
During the Marcos regime, the professionalism of the AFP suffered a 
major setback.  In his effort to restore morale and rid the AFP of corruption, he 
instituted a drastic shakeup in the military command structure by removing key 
constabulary commanders and forcing over a dozen generals in the AFP to 
retire, replacing them with officers based on close personal ties.40   As president, 
Marcos used his position with cunning ability to surround himself with loyalists 
creating what McCoy describes as a “parallel command,” a force that would be 
used during his 1967 reelection campaign.41  By doing this, he damaged the 
unity of the armed forces and factionalized the officer corps.  Increasingly the 
                                            
34 Steinberg, p. 109. 
35 Ibid. 





41 McCoy, p. 28. 
13 
AFP became more politicized as officers once committed to upholding the 
supremacy of the civil authority and service to the entire society now served 
Marcos and his self-appointed civilian bureaucracy.   
Meanwhile, US patronage continued as the Marcos regime maintained its 
strong connection to Washington thus allowing the continuous flow of military 
assistance given the strategic importance of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay. 42  In 
exchange for $34 million in US assistance, Marcos provided a meager contingent 
of two thousand engineers in support of the Vietnam War.43  During his regime, 
Marcos increased the budget of the AFP by nearly 50 percent and increased 
military strength to 63,000 by 1972.44 This force included an entire generation of 
officers who would take part in the martial law declared later that year. 
Under the pretext of a communist coup, Marcos used his emergency 
powers and declared martial law in September 1972.45   Despite its muted 
disappointment, Washington continued to maintain good diplomatic relations with 
the regime, convinced that the presence of US bases in the Philippines would 
maintain stability in the region.46   Portraying himself as a staunch American ally, 
Marcos received US support in the battle against insurgency and enjoyed an 
increase in military assistance after 1972.47 The US later abandoned their 
support of the Marcos administration shifting their security goal to “the 
preservation of an anticommunist regime.”48 
One of the legacies of martial law is the politicization of the AFP, which 
came to threaten the regime itself.49  During this period of dictatorship, the 
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Philippine officer corps was deprofessionalized as they enforced authoritarian 
rule arresting opponents and filling civilian posts.  Toward the end of Marcos’ 
regime, the condition of the officer corps was described as “split into factions and 
clandestine brotherhoods, fragmenting the armed forces and encouraging coup 
conspiracies.”50  It was under this politicized situation that the Reform the Armed 
Forces Movement (RAM) was formed and led by Colonel “Gringo” Honasan.  
This group of military officers rallied under the leadership of Defense Minister 
Juan Ponce Enrile to oust Marcos.  Backed by the convergence of masses at 
Ephifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA), the military (except for the Marcos 
loyalist faction) intervened and shifted its support to Corazon Aquino.  This 
uprising was later dubbed as the “People Power Revolution” or the “EDSA 
Revolution.” 
The unexpected and tumultuous rise of Corazon Aquino to power signaled 
the return of democracy and civilian control.  This also meant reprofessionalizing 
the AFP and a whole generation of AFP officers who were part of the previous 
dictatorship.  Her administration, however, was faced with the daunting task of 
rebuilding political order and controlling the powerful military establishment of the 
previous regime.  Among her top priorities was to deal with the human rights 
violations during Marcos’ rule, an argument later given by a RAM analyst as the 
ultimate reason of the coups against her because the Human Rights Commission 
focused only on the violations perpetrated by soldiers.51  Other actions that 
alienated her from the military was the release of political prisoners, most of 
whom were leftists, and opening negotiations with the New People’s Army 
(NPA)52 – the group her armed forces were fighting against. 
The Aquino regime was riddled with nine coup attempts, which 
complicated her attempt to consolidate power.  In terms of military 
professionalism, the coups indicated divisions within the AFP manifested by the 
actions of RAM who were unwilling to submit to civilian authority.  Even at the top 
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level of the military hierarchy, the signs of factionalism were also apparent.  
However, her alliance with the faction under her Chief of Staff, General Ramos 
“assured her survival and his succession to the presidency.”53  This alliance 
would also earn Ramos his appointment as Secretary of National Defense before 
running for the country’s highest office. 
In the six years of her presidency and despite her challenges with the 
military establishment, Aquino implemented reforms to enhance military 
professionalism.  She shifted her administration’s policy to a “total war against 
communist insurgents” while addressing some of the military’s concerns.54  More 
significantly, she passed the Republic Act 6975 establishing the Department of 
Interior and Local Government and created the Philippine National Police (PNP) 
under civilian control.55        
Backed by outgoing President Aquino, General Ramos emerged victorious 
over the hotly contested presidential elections in 1992.  A West Point graduate, 
President Ramos was most instrumental in the initial efforts to modernize the 
AFP.  The success of the modernization efforts would be a welcome change for 
the AFP, which was badly in need of new equipment.   Partly shifting the role of 
the military, he emphasized its involvement in national development activities.  
He was also responsible for the amnesty program, which allowed certain AFP 
officers involved in the coup attempts to return to military service.56  
During his presidency, Ramos also appointed a considerable number of 
retired military to civilian posts.57  This development, in its own way, was a return 
to the politicization of the military or militarization of the civilian sector.  The fact 
that these retired generals were so identified still indicated the corporateness of 
the military as distinct from civilian society.  Because they had not shed off their 
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military mindset, the military was perceived as playing a hand in politics.  At a 
time when Philippine politics was attempting to strengthen civilian control of the 
military, this action appeared to be a departure from military professionalism.   
Moreover the role of the military in national development activities, as in the case 
of other countries in Southeast Asia, Thailand and Indonesia, presented a 
renewed concern about further politicization of the military. 
The new administration under President Estrada saw another 
manifestation of civilian patronage over a certain military faction.   Allying himself 
with former RAM leaders, Senators Enrile and Honasan, Estrada established his 
own network of support in the AFP.  A key appointment in his administration was 
one of Honasan’s PMA classmates, Chief of Police Panfilo Lacson, who in turn 
made his own powerful network in the PNP by promoting three PMA classmates 
to regional commands.58 
Estrada’s administration, although short-lived, left some legacies, which 
had a tremendous impact on the professionalism of the AFP.  First among these 
was his administration’s moratorium on the much-touted modernization program 
approved during the Ramos regime.59  This delay has added another setback to 
the already poorly equipped armed forces.  Secondly, it was under Estrada’s 
regime that the controversial Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was passed.60  
This facilitated continued military cooperation between the US and the 
Philippines and presented potential economic benefits to the local economies 
where joint military exercises were held.  Thirdly, Estrada’s impeachment 
because of graft and corruption and the subsequent withdrawal of AFP’s support 
showed the military leadership’s unwillingness to allow the chief executive to 
usurp his position for political or economic gain. 
Similar to the first People Power Revolution at EDSA that propelled 
Aquino to power, Chief of Staff General Angelo Reyes spearheaded the military 
intervention by shifting his support to Macapagal-Arroyo.  The January 2001 
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uprising, referred to as “People Power II” or “EDSA DOS” was once again 
marked by the convergence of the masses at the same location as in 1986. This 
time, the civilian uprising and military intervention was caused by pro-Estrada 
senators who voted not to open an envelope believed to contain evidence of 
corruption and suspended impeachment proceedings. 
The new Macapagal-Arroyo government did not miss a beat in the “total 
war” policy against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) adopted during the 
Estrada administration.61  She was also placed at the forefront on the war on 
terrorism when the US extended its global campaign in the Philippines after the 
9/11 terrorist attacks.  Her unwavering support of the US-led efforts against 
terrorism and the war in Iraq were instrumental for designating the Philippines as 
a “Major Non-Nato Ally.” 
As the new Commander-in-Chief, Macapal-Arroyo appointed General 
Angelo Reyes as Secretary of National Defense, a move seen by many as a 
reward for Reyes’ role in her rise to the presidency.  Within the two-and-a-half 
years in office, she appointed a succession of four generals (Cimatu, Defensor, 
Santiago, and Abaya) to fill the AFP Chief of Staff position.  Serving less than a 
year, these revolving-door appointments to the highest military position are highly 
suspect as patronage as these appointments did not provide the continuity the 
AFP needed at a time when the country was confronted with escalating internal 
security challenges, particularly the MILF and Abu Sayyaf in Mindanao and the 
post-9/11 global war on terrorism.   
The failed mutiny perpetrated by a group of junior officers presented the 
Macapagal-Arroyo regime with the greatest civil-military relations dilemma.  
Highlighting corruption at the highest levels of government including the AFP, the 
rebellious officers barricaded themselves in the Oakwood Premier Hotel in the 
country’s economic district of Makati and presented their grievances.  They 
challenged the legitimacy of the government and demanded the resignation of 
Macapagal-Arroyo, Defense Secretary Reyes, and Military Intelligence Chief 
Brigadier General Victor Corpus.  Unlike the successful military interventions of 
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1986 and 2001, this coup mutiny did not have support from top leaders of the 
AFP nor from the mass population.  The mutinous officers surrendered 
peacefully and returned to their barracks pending results of further hearings and 
investigations.  
Following the end of the standoff, Brigadier General Corpus resigned as 
Chief of Military Intelligence to end the “restiveness” of the AFP.62  A month later, 
Defense Secretary Reyes also resigned amidst political pressure.  Commenting 
on the state of civil-military affairs and alluding to a larger political conspiracy and 
power grabs in the country, he said, “What is more disturbing is that, despite the 
long tradition of democratic practice in the country and a vocal citizenry steeped 
in democratic ideals, some mainstream politicos in the Philippines now seem to 
actually want the military involved in what are essentially political contests.”63 
The Philippine model of professionalism can largely be attributed to the 
role the US played in influencing the formation and the development of the AFP.  
Over the past century, the US has both positively and negatively affected the 
professionalism of the Philippine officer corps.  The “special relationship” of the 
two countries has benefited the Philippines significantly through American 
benevolence.  During the colonial period, the US practically created, trained, and 
equipped the AFP officer cadre.  The US also filled the role for the external 
defense of the country.  Following its independence, the Philippines remained 
dependent on security matters as the US continued to serve as a security blanket 
for both internal and external defense until the withdrawal of US bases.   
The US-Philippines relations, however, also undermined military profes-
sionalism at least in a couple of respects.  Because of the same American 
benevolence, the AFP had difficulty establishing itself as a strong and 
autonomous institution.  The AFP’s overdependence on the US for its roles in 
internal and external defense has created a safety net but also created a security 
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dilemma when the US bases were withdrawn.  Secondly, politicization in the 
military increased because of the pattern of political patronage.  This was 
especially true during the Quirino, Magsaysay and Marcos regimes as discussed 
above.  Although politicization is inevitable because of the AFP’s expanding role 
in economic development, the colonial legacy of political patronage tend to 
influence political alliances and factionalize the military establishment. 
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III. AREAS OF US INFLUENCE 
This chapter discusses four areas in which the US has, in one way or 
another, influenced military professionalism.  As the premier military institution, 
PMA is the first step in the process of professional development for the majority 
of future officers in the AFP.  This research assesses PMA’s curriculum in 
military professionalism and determines the extent of US influence.  A second 
area of influence discussed in this chapter is the attendance of Philippine cadets 
at US service academies and their role in shaping military professionalism.   
Thirdly, the participation of AFP officers in various US military schools through 
the IMET program is also discussed to evaluate the success of the program and 
the extent to which returning graduates are able to exert influence in their 
respective organizations.  Lastly, this chapter examines mil-to-mil exercises and 
determines how these US-Philippines bilateral activities enhance military 
professionalism. 
 
A. THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY 
General Delos Santos, a former Commanding General of the Philippine 
Army, commented that “PMA has been patterned after West Point and we are 
very proud in saying that PMA is the West Point in Asia … if you look at PMA as 
West Point, PMA is more West Point than West Point itself.”64  Indeed, the basic 
officer training at PMA has a good measure of US influence.  As the premier 
institution for military training in the Philippines, PMA applies US training 
principles and practices.  Under the National Defense Act on 21 December 1936 
(or Commonwealth Act No. 1), the PMA was formally established, conferring a 
Bachelor of Science degree to its graduates as a four-year institution.65  Beyond 
the West Point-style cadet uniforms, PMA serves as the breeding ground for 
military professionalism.  McCoy points out that General MacArthur, having been 
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a former Superintendent at the US Military Academy, transported the West Point 
system into the newly established institution.66  Like West Point, PMA afforded 
the opportunity to integrate cadets from various social and regional backgrounds 
and then socialized these future officers “in new values that would make them 
servants of state power.”67  McCoy adds that the curriculum and culture at West 
Point “would also prove effective at PMA.”68 
The outbreak of the Second World War interrupted training at PMA but 
reopened on 5 May 1947, restoring the US pattern prior to the war.69   The 
curriculum combines engineering, behavioral sciences, and humanities courses.  
The historical background of PMA notes that the curriculum remained 
fundamentally the same from 1935 through 1960s.70  In the 1970s, more 
technical courses were added and then shifted to socio-humanistic-oriented 
courses.  In the 1990s, PMA’s curriculum was restructured from a general 
education focus to a tri-service concept to preempt the establishment of separate 
service academies.71  The tri-service curriculum conferred Bachelor of Science 
degrees with majors in Management for the Army, Aeronautical Science for the 
Air Force, and Naval Systems Engineering for the Navy.  Later, academic majors 
were made independent of the tri-service curriculum giving cadets a choice in 
three academic majors:  Management, Computer Science, and General 
Engineering.72   
Another curriculum review was conducted in 1998, which led to the 
formulation of a new curriculum with a generalist perspective.  This curriculum, 
however, presented an academic overload on cadets (175 units of coursework 
compared to 156 units at US service academies) and lacked focus by “teaching 
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little of everything.”73  In June 2003, a revised curriculum was unveiled based on 
the 1998 curriculum but reduced the academic overload from 175 to 146 units.  
The new academic program now offers degrees in Management, Information 
Systems, and General Engineering, allowing cadets to focus on a chosen field of 
study.  The following are the major features of the 2003 curriculum:74 
1.  Overarching Goal:  To produce 21st century leaders of our Armed 
Forces who are aware of the national and world security issues and who can 
anticipate and perform their roles effectively and are adaptable to the social, 
economic, political, and technological challenges of the environment. 
2.  Core Program:  The core program consist of 29 subjects that contain 
elements of a broad, general education designed to give cadets a fundamental 
knowledge in the arts and sciences.  The program establishes the foundation for 
major area electives that will allow the cadets to major in Management, General 
Engineering, or Information Systems.  It also provides the necessary base of 
knowledge required by the Major Service Professional Courses. 
3.  Professional Course Program:  Professional courses that train cadets 
to become functional and effective junior officers in their selected major service.  
All undergo the Basic Military Training which offers basic soldiery skills.  Based 
on ones selected major service, each cadet completes service specific 
curriculum. 
4.  The Major Area Elective (MAE) Program:  The three academic majors 
offered initially are Management, Information Systems, and General Engineering. 
5.  Leadership Development Program:  Focusing on the development of 
character and military skills, this program aims to develop the character, 
professionalism, and aptitude of each cadet as required of a regular officer in the 
AFP.  This program also provides leadership training and develops basic 
qualities and attributes of leadership, progressing from a small unit to company 
level leadership.  
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6.  Physical Education Program:  The physical education curriculum 
consists of eight subjects aimed at developing the physical condition of cadets to 
its maximum level while developing confidence, positive attitude, sportsmanship, 
esprit-de-corps, teamwork, and self-discipline. 
In addition to the contributions in the curriculum history of PMA, the US 
also has exerted influence in other areas.  According to General Adan, the 49th 
Superintendent of PMA, US exchange professors served in the PMA faculty from 
the 1960s through the 1980s.75  Training equipment was also provided as part of 
the US assistance program.  These programs ceased after the withdrawal of US 
bases in the Philippines.  Also worth noting is the number of US-trained officers 
currently serving in the Academy’s corps of professors and staff.  Among 154 
officers, 15 have attended US training, including a 1983 graduate of the US 
Coast Guard Academy who is serving as Assistant Superintendent for 
Educational Plans and Programs. 
A milestone in 1993, under the Republic Act 7192, PMA admitted its first 
female cadets.76  Today the academy continues its fine tradition of producing 
professional men and women ready to fulfill their role as guardians of the people 
and the state, “trained in a revered institution that molds and develops future 
leaders and vanguards of national posterity and freedom.”77  In President 
Arroyo’s speech at the Academy, she reminded the Class of 2002 of the very 
essence of professionalism that “The Armed Forces is a constitutional 
instrument.  It defends democracy and protects human rights.  It holds 
unconditional allegiance to civilian authority and to the unity of command.  It 
adheres to a code of discipline and absolute fealty to the constitution.”78 
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B. US SERVICE ACADEMIES 
The US influence on military professionalism may also be attributed to the 
attendance of Filipinos at the US service academies.  In 1908, the US Congress 
authorized the admission of Filipinos at West Point although their commissions 
were restricted to service in the Philippine Scouts.79  The US Army maintained 
their reservations about Filipino officership until the natives began graduating at 
West Point.  The first Filipino cadet, Vicente P. Lim, gained such significance as 
he graduated with an academic rank of 77 among 107.80  He later progressed 
through the ranks to become a general officer and paved the way for younger 
Filipino officers.  
By the end of the 1930s, there were a total of 26 Filipino West Point 
graduates some of whom served as the core cadre at PMA in 1936.81  It is 
difficult to measure the impact these graduates had upon returning to serve in the 
AFP.  McCoy notes, however, that by opening the Constabulary Academy and 
sending Filipinos to West Point “the American regime fostered an alternative form 
of military professionalism.”82 The Philippines continues to send cadets to USMA 
and other US service academies but further research is necessary to obtain a 
better understanding of its impact on the professionalism of the AFP.  Interviews 
with Filipino officers seem to indicate that today a growing trend of Filipino 
graduates of US service academies leave the AFP after their initial service 
commitment to pursue civilian careers. 
A significant highlight of this “West Point Connection” is General Fidel V. 
Ramos.  A career army officer and a West Point alumnus, he served as the Chief 
of the Philippine Constabulary during the Marcos regime.  He later became AFP 
Deputy Chief of Staff in 1981 and Chief of Staff in 1986.  He was identified as 
one of the close associates of President Marcos but switched sides aligning 
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himself to Corazon Aquino and the “People Power” movement.83 During the 
Aquino administration, he served as defense secretary, continuing to support her 
strongly through several coup attempts. A known believer in civilian supremacy 
over the military, General Ramos was instrumental in preventing the coup 
attempts of rightist military rebels as he placed his loyalty behind the Aquino 
regime. 84 In 1992, General Ramos was elected as President of the Philippines. 
The recent appointment of Lieutenant General Narciso Abaya (USMA ’71) 
to head the AFP is another significant highlight for Filipino West Point graduates.  
General Abaya’s military record reflects an impeccable record on his 
professionalism as an officer and confirms the confidence that the President has 
placed on him.  His past and future contributions in shaping military 
professionalism in the AFP may not be tangible but certainly has an imprint of US 
influence through the West Point connection. 
 
C. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
The US, under the auspices of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
(DSCA), conducts the International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
program.  As part of the US security assistance program,  IMET provides 
professional military education to students from allied and friendly nations such 
as the Philippines exposing them to US professional organizations, procedures, 
and the manner in which military organizations function under civilian control.85   
This program is particularly important for the Philippines because it allows AFP 
officers access to US courses that are not available elsewhere and unaffordable 
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given budgetary constraints.   Between fiscal years 1992 through 2001, the US 
has provided over $1.9 million in IMET funding for the Philippines.86  
   Measuring the effectiveness of IMET in the Philippines is one way of 
gauging US influence in military professionalism.  In evaluating the success of 
IMET, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) requires the State 
Department and the Department of Defense to demonstrate the achievement of 
the program.87  In 1994, the National Defense Research Institute published case 
studies of US IMET training on Thailand and the Philippines to evaluate its role in 
internal defense and development.   The following US objectives were identified 
for the Philippines:88  
• Retain contact and influence with the Philippine military in the absence 
of the day-to-day relationship that existed prior to the base withdrawal; 
• Uphold its R.P.-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty responsibilities; 
• Ensure that the Philippine military is competent and compatible with 
the United States’ military; 
• Maximize joint training and interoperability as outlined in the East 
Asian Strategy Initiative; and 
• Continue to support democracy and human rights in the Philippines. 
In this case study, there were three multipliers used as measures of 
influence: (1) US-trained officers train their counterparts upon their return from 
the United States; (2) The US trains a disproportionate number of leaders; and, 
(3) The training conducted by the Philippine military relies heavily on US doctrine, 
training manuals, and equipment.89  The following were key concluding 
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observations, which indicate the need for both government and military exposure 
to the theoretical and practical issues of IMET:90 
• The government is still riddled with corruption, and democratic 
institutions continue to be misused. 
• The Philippine military has lost its traditional respect for civilian 
authority, continues to perpetrate brutal human-rights abuses, and 
has failed to eliminate the two insurgencies that have plagued the 
country for more than 20 years. 
• The Philippines’ internal and external defense efforts are 
threatened by the country’s persistent lack of financial resources 
and would benefit from improved defense resource management. 
It has been over a decade since these observations were made, but, even 
with the lack of another independent study, empirical evidence will show that 
these same observations still persist.  However, the US remains committed to 
support the IMET program as the cornerstone of Pacific Command’s Theater 
Security Cooperation Program.   Admiral Dennis Blair argued that it is “the best 
means for promoting professionalism within foreign armed forces and exposing 
foreign armed forces to the principle of a military responsive to civilian control.”91 
 
D. US-PHILIPPINES MIL-TO-MIL EXERCISES 
The presence of US bases in the past provided a security blanket for the 
Philippines and gave the US a de facto role for the country’s external defense.  
The end of the Cold War and the failure of the Philippine government to renew 
the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) have changed the nature of the AFP’s 
mission and for the first time has gained the primary responsibility for external 
defense.92  As a result, the Philippines is forced to rely on the existing bilateral 
security and defense arrangements with the US to enhance its defense posture 
and capability.  These arrangements include the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1951, 
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the Military Assistance Agreement of 1947, the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Agreement of 1953, and the Visiting Forces Agreement ratified in 1999.93 
  These agreements signify the increasing reliance on Mil-to-Mil relations 
between the two countries in both operational and functional levels.94  The 
termination of the MBA left the MDT as the sole foundation of US-Philippines 
security relationship.  As part of this relationship, both countries conduct joint 
military exercises to meet their security objectives.  Agustin identifies the benefits 
for the Philippines through these exercises. 95 First, they enable the AFP to 
bridge the military technological gap between the two forces as it lacks not only 
the modern equipment but also the training to use this equipment.   As a force 
multiplier, these exercises enhance the skills and capability of AFP members.  
Furthermore, the joint nature of these activities provides a confidence-building 
atmosphere and facilitates the cross-flow of information.  Lastly, they sustain 
defense and security relations both in the region and at the bilateral level. 
  Balikatan (meaning Shoulder-to-Shoulder) Exercise is one of the higher 
profile exercises conducted in the Philippines especially after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks.  This training exercise is a joint and combined multilateral training 
exercise conducted in the Philippines with military counterparts from both the US 
and the AFP.  Besides improving military interoperability among military units and 
their service members, Balikatan also enhances positive military relations 
between the two countries. 
  Talon Vision is another Mil-to-Mil exercise that the US and the Philippines 
conduct periodically.  During the November 2003 exercise, 400 US Marines and 
900 AFP soldiers participated in this joint training aimed to boost the capabilities 
of Philippine forces battling communist and Muslim separatist guerrillas.  As part 
of the training, troops from both countries shared tactics, techniques, and 
                                            






procedures including the operation of US and Philippine military aircraft and 
equipment.96  
The table below lists other bilateral Mil-to-Mil exercises between the 
Philippine and US Armed Forces: 
 
Figure 1. List of RP-US Mil-to-Mil Exercises 
 
The benefits that the Philippines receive through these exercises have a 
direct impact not only in developing the expertise of the AFP but also in fulfilling 
their responsibility in external and internal defense.  However, the difficulties 
encountered to finalize the terms of the scheduled 2003 Balikatan Exercise 
shows how important it is for the two countries to work together to ensure that the 
rules of operation fall within the purview of Philippine laws and other legal 
parameters as provided for in the MDT and the VFA.97 
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By and large, the US has left a positive influence in military professional-
ism in the AFP in at least four areas.  Philippine Military Academy as originally 
envisioned by General MacArthur continues to produce professional leaders in 
the AFP.  The PMA leadership has made necessary adjustments through 
deliberate planning and curriculum reviews to create a program that meets the 
requirements of the three major services in the AFP.  Service academies in the 
US have produced graduates who became key leaders in the history of the 
Philippines including General Fidel V. Ramos who served as Chief of Staff of the 
AFP, Secretary of National Defense, then later President of the Philippines.   
Additional research tracing the careers Filipino graduates at US service 
academies may present a better picture on this area of US influence.  Training 
through IMET continues to be an essential element in shaping the 
professionalism of Philippine officers.  Even though the 1994 IMET case study on 
the Philippines reflects disturbing observations, consideration must be given to 
the fact that a sizeable portion of officers who served during the Marcos regime 
still remain in the AFP, some of whom may be in leadership positions.  Critical to 
the maintenance of expertise in the AFP are the Mil-to-Mil exercises participated 
in by both countries.  Exercise planners, however, must continue to work more 
closely to ensure the rules of engagement fall within the purview of Philippine 









































IV. THE CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND OTHER 
CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THE AFP 
Critical to the AFP’s ability to fulfill its roles and missions in the 21st 
Century is how it transforms itself while maintaining viability. This chapter 
examines two issues affecting military professionalism.  First, the changing 
security environment and the war on terrorism have forced the AFP to reevaluate 
its current capabilities and work more closely with the US in the global war on 
terrorism.  Secondly, and in light of this new security environment, the AFP is 
confronted with the concepts of the postmodern military and the Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA).  These are relevant issues in terms of US influence on 
military professionalism in the AFP because they have reshaped the special 
relationship between the two countries. 
The end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of US bases changed the 
security environment in the Philippines.  Following the 11 September 2001 
attacks in New York and Washington DC, the Philippines joined the US-led 
global war against terrorism.  This new focus on terrorism also changed the 
security environment and has altered the nature of US-Philippines relations.  
President Arroyo staunchly supported the campaign against terrorists when the 
two countries began cooperating to hunt down remnants of Abu Sayyaf which 
kidnapped foreign tourists and missionaries including several Americans.  With 
the inclusion of the New People’s Army (NPA) in the US’ list of terrorist 
organizations and its continuing efforts to pursue trace transnational terrorists 
within the region, the US and the Philippines have embarked on a new 
cooperative security strategy.  This chapter will explore the implications of 
terrorism on US-Philippines relations and its impact on military professionalism.  
The concept of the postmodern military is emerging in the United States 
and other Western democracies.  In the post-Cold War era and the reduction of 
external threat, the military establishment is changing in character and shifting 
away from the traditional military purpose of fighting wars.  Can the AFP fit the 
mold of the postmodern military and what are its implications in the current 
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mission and force structure?  In 1999, a related concept called the Revolution in 
Military Affairs was advanced by then Secretary of Defense Cohen.  This concept 
encourages the professional military to seize “the opportunity to transform its 
strategy, military doctrine, training, education organization, equipment, 
operations and tactics to achieve decisive military results in fundamentally new 
ways.”98  The advent of information technologies has drastically changed the way 
the US and other modern armed forces fight wars while the AFP continues to 
struggle in its modernization efforts.  This chapter also assesses the extent to 
which the AFP is addressing this issue and how it affects military 
professionalism. 
 
A. THE CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM 
The end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of the US bases from the 
country have altered the security environment for the AFP.99  The terrorist 
attacks on US soil in September 2001 and the ensuing global war on terrorism 
has further altered this security environment.  This new security environment 
presents new challenges for the AFP to meet its requirements in the 21st 
Century.  In 1995, the Ramos administration approved the 331 billion peso AFP 
modernization program, which emphasized external defense; however, the 
resurgence of internal threats has prompted the AFP to revise its priorities.100  
The Arroyo administration’s 14 Pillars of Policy and Action against Terrorism also 
signaled a new focus on the role of the AFP to address anti- and counter-
terrorism measures.101   
                                            
98 Jan Breemer, War as We Knew It: The Real Revolution in Military Affairs/Understanding 
Paralysis in Military Operations (Occasional Paper No. 19, Center for Strategy and Technology, 
Air War College, December 2000), p. 3. 
99 Clarita C. Carlos, Revolution in Military Affairs:  Philippine Perspectives (Paper presented at 
the Asia Pacific Governance 2000 Conference, Brisbane, Australia, 27-28 April 2000), p. 5. 
100 US State Department, Annual Report on Military Expenditures, 1999 
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/99_amiex3.html> (10 Jun 03). 
101 Francisco Tolin, The Response of the Philippine Government and the Role of the AFP in 
Addressing Terrorism <http://www.ndcp.edu.ph/articles/template.htm?a_no=3> (15 June 2003). 
34 
While the end of the Cold War has diminished external threats to the 
country, the Philippines is forced to rely on the existing bilateral security and 
defense arrangements with the US to enhance its defense posture and 
capability.  These arrangements include the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1951, the 
Military Assistance Agreement of 1947, the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Agreement of 1953, and the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) ratified in 1999.102  
The VFA is a major step in “restabilizing a good military-to-military relationship” 
and the resumption of joint exercises between the two countries.103   
The presence of US bases in the past not only provided a security blanket 
for the Philippines but also supported the AFP in its war against insurgencies. 104   
The failure of the Philippine government to renew the Military Bases Agreement 
(MBA) has changed the nature of the AFP’s mission and for the first time has the 
primary responsibility for external defense.105  The withdrawal of US bases also 
forfeited many direct and indirect benefits the AFP received in terms of 
operational, logistics and training support.  This decision also cost the Philippine 
government dearly as resources for the procurement of much needed military 
equipment virtually disappeared.106 The seriousness of the AFP’s external 
defense capability came to light in February 1995 when a Chinese military 
buildup was discovered on one of the islands in the disputed Spratlys.107  This is 
still an unresolved issue and is considered as an impingement on the Philippines’ 
territorial integrity and its exclusive economic zone.108  Another element to the 
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“China threat” perception is the passage “China’s Law of the Sea” in 1992 which 
reasserts its “claim of sovereignty over the entire South China Sea.”109     
There are three main sources of domestic terrorists confronting the AFP, 
some of whom have links with international terrorist organizations:  the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a Muslim separatist group; the New People’s 
Army (NPA), a Maoist-inspired communist group; and the Abu Sayyaf, a small 
group of Muslim separatists backed by al-Queda.110  McDonald notes, “It is 
terrorist infiltration and subversion that pose the primary security threats to the 
Philippines, not an invasion from without.”111   
Terrorism has altered both the role of the AFP and the nature of US-
Philippines relations.  The Philippines has had its share of domestic and 
international terrorism in the past, but none has had a more magnified impact 
than those of 11 September.  The AFP is mandated as the lead agency for 
terrorism as internal security threats, which, subject to national government 
approval, warrants the deployment of military force.112  With this role, the AFP 
has established solid plans in its campaign against terrorism but recognizes the 
need to improve its doctrines and operations to handle the threat effectively.113 
   More significantly, the threat of transnational terrorism and the resulting 
global campaign led by the US reshaped the relationship between the two 
countries.  The initial response in the Philippines was focused on the small Abu 
Sayyaf terrorist group with US Special Forces performing a limited role to “advise 
and assist.”114  In September 2002, President George W. Bush recognized the 
importance of America’s alliances in Asia in the war against terrorism and 
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highlighted that they “not only underpin regional peace and stability, but are 
flexible and ready to deal with new challenges.” He also indicated a “deepened 
cooperation on counter-terrorism with our alliance partners” particularly in 
Thailand and the Philippines. 115  
On 12 October 2001, President Arroyo issued her “14 Pillars in Combating 
Terrorism,” designed to strengthen internal counter-terrorism efforts.  This 
strategy highlights the delineation of responsibilities, modernization of forces, 
anticipation and preparation of future attacks, enlisting the cooperation of other 
sectors in society, and addressing the varied underpinnings of terrorism.116  
Taking a more holistic approach, the government also emphasized a two-
pronged strategy by “waging war on terrorism as it wages war on poverty,” a 
policy that prioritizes economic recovery.117 
Related to President Arroyo’s May 2003 visit to the US, the United States 
has committed a “minimum” of $356 million in security-related assistance.118  
This is a tremendous boost to the financially-constrained AFP not only in its 
counter-terrorists operations but also for critically needed equipment, training, 
and civic action programs.  This also dwarfs the $3.4 million of total military 
assistance from the US in 2001.119  The package, which will provide funds to 
train and equip Philippine forces in its fight against terrorism includes: 
• Counterterrorism Equipment and Training: $30 million in new grant 
aid for equipment and training of Armed Forces of the Philippines 
targeted at capabilities for countering terrorist groups within 
Philippines. 
• Development Assistance to Conflict Areas: $30 million in new 
bilateral development assistance for Mindanao and support for the 
peace process with the MILF, as appropriate. 
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• Establishment of Combat Engineering Unit: $25 million in new grant 
assistance to train and to equip a combat engineering unit and 
provide other military needs in the war on terror. The engineering 
unit will be able to do civic action and humanitarian projects in 
conflict zones. 
• U.S. Military Support to Philippine Counterterrorism Operations: 
Agreement to provide U.S. military support to Armed Forces of the 
Philippines-led operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group. 
• Support to Philippine Military Mobility: 20 UH-1H helicopters, as 
they become available and funding for refurbishment and transport 
is secured; an additional 10 UH-1H helicopters to be provided to 
ensure sufficient spare parts. 
• Comprehensive Security Review: Launching of a comprehensive 
review of Philippine security needs and how the United States can 
best support Philippine military modernization and reform. 
• U.S. Defense Goods and Services: Up to $10 million in Presidential 
Drawdown Authority for equipment, spare parts and 
maintenance.120 
The war on terrorism and the resulting deepened cooperation between the 
US and the Philippines has benefited the AFP in a variety of ways.  First, the 
enormous amount of security and military assistance it received from the US 
enabled the armed forces to upgrade a significant portion of its obsolete 
equipment – a result that the modernization program was unable to deliver.  
Second, the AFP received valuable training through the joint military exercises 
that otherwise would not have been available.  Thirdly, the increase in military 
assistance enhanced the AFP’s capability to conduct civic action and 
humanitarian projects and will enhance civil-military relations in many 
impoverished areas.  Collectively these benefits offer an enormous boost to the 
effectiveness of the armed forces, along with increased morale among military 
personnel and the heightened public image of the military.  More significantly, the 
designation of the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally will allow the “U.S. and 
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Philippines to work together on military research and development and give 
Philippines greater access to American defense equipment and supplies.”121 
 
B. THE POSTMODERN MILITARY AND THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY 
AFFAIRS 
The altered security environment that confronts the AFP brings into 
question the concept of the postmodern military.  With the diminished threat of 
external aggression at the end of the Cold War, the character of the AFP may no 
longer be so distinctive from that of the larger Philippine society.  Moskos 
suggests five organizational changes that characterize the postmodern military: 
• Increasing structural and cultural interpenetrability of civilian and 
military spheres 
• Reducing the differences within the armed forces (branch, rank, 
roles) 
• Shifting military role from fighting wars to non-traditional missions 
• Increasing role of the military in international missions 
• Internationalizing the forces themselves122 
The legal mandate of the AFP is to:  (1) Uphold the sovereignty, support 
the constitution, and defend the territory of the Republic of the Philippines against 
all enemies, foreign and domestic; (2) Promote and advance the national aims, 
interests, and policies; and (3) Plan, organize, maintain and deploy its regular 
and citizen reserve forces for national security.  Dr. Clarita Carlos, former 
President of the National Defense College of the Philippines argues that the AFP 
has, from the time of its establishment, performed non-traditional military roles.123 
Can the AFP fit the postmodern military mold?  The answer is, “Yes,” 
based on the new emphasis of non-traditional military roles that the AFP is 
playing.  It has engaged in socio-economic activities in support of government 
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programs in national building.  Some of these missions include social 
mobilization projects such as the Floating Government Centers, and Adopt-a-
Mountain – programs interfaced with economic development and poverty 
eradication.  In December 2003, about a thousand members of the AFP’s 
National Capital Regional Command augmented the number of policemen 
manning checkpoints as a response to the rash of kidnapping incidents.124 
The Philippine Army is also involved in community assistance and rural 
empowerment through social services (CARES) aimed at enhancing the 
government’s ability to deliver public services.  The Navy’s Floating Government 
Centers provide basic services to people in remote coastal areas.  The AFP is 
also involved in literacy programs designed to teach people in rural areas.  Other 
missions engaged the AFP in disaster preparedness and response as well as 
environmental defense programs.  All these are part of the AFP’s Civil Military 
Operations (CMO) designed to apply the “peaceful and humanitarian” approach 
in reaching out to the mass base support of the “enemies of the State.”125 
Since the early 1950s, the AFP participated in various peace operations 
such as the Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea (PEFTOK), the Philippine Air 
Force Contingent to Congo, and the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) to 
South Vietnam.  More recently, the Philippine Army has participated in UN 
operations including deployments to the Iraq-Kuwait border and in Haiti.  In 1999, 
about 650 personnel participated in the International Force in East Timor under 
the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET).  Serving as the first 
commander of UNTAET was Lieutenant General Jaime de los Santos.126  
Currently, there are 66 personnel serving in support of the United Nations 
Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), which includes eight observers.127  
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In June 2003, the government announced sending a 75-member contingent to 
compliment 100 medical and social welfare workers to Iraq.  In November 2003, 
the AFP also sent 145 soldiers for peacekeeping duties in Liberia.128 This 
deployment provides not only UN visibility but also the necessary experience to 
help the AFP manage its own problems of insurgencies and separatist 
movements. 
The AFP’s deeper involvement and emphasis on non-traditional military 
missions directly impacts military professionalism.  Their engagement with civil 
society in national development through CMOs significantly narrows the gap 
between the military and civilian community.  By “civilianizing” the military, the 
officer corps and rank-and-file find themselves working more closely with their 
civilian counterparts.  This exposure and cooperative interaction prevents the 
military professional from developing the mindset that they are apart from the 
civilian government or from society itself.129  The visibility of the military through 
civic action programs also raises the military’s image in impoverished and conflict 
areas. 
The Revolution in Military Affairs is yet another challenge that the AFP 
must confront in the 21st Century.  This subject is relevant and unavoidable for 
the military professional who must deal with the changed security environment.  It 
also affects the modernization program in order for the AFP plans for its future 
mission and structure.  Former Secretary of Defense Cohen described RMA 
“occurs when the nation’s military seizes an opportunity to transform its strategy, 
military doctrine, training, education, organization, equipment, operations, and 
tactics to achieve decisive military results in fundamentally new ways.”130 
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Dr. Carlos interviewed the Secretary of National Defense and top officials 
in the AFP to obtain their perspectives on this RMA subject.  The following are 
her conclusions: 
• The security environment has indeed changed and this requires 
some rethinking in the way the AFP conducts its affairs; 
• Among the challenges confronting the AFP, economic constraints 
loom large and are viewed as major obstacles to its modernization 
efforts; 
• RMA requires shifts in doctrine, organization, operation, education, 
and equipage but the pace of change happening in other countries 
may not happen in the AFP for many valid reasons; 
• Technological changes in information and equipment available to 
the military will necessarily engender changes in the way the AFP 
will conduct its war and peacetime functions; and 
• Given an asymmetric relation with an adversary, the AFP can still 
fight a war by other means using less sophisticated but equally 
capable means131 
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V. THE FAILED MUTINY IN JULY 2003:  TOWARD AN 
INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
On 27 July 2003, a group of 323 soldiers led by junior officers mostly from 
elite units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) took control of the 
Oakwood Premier Apartments, Ayala Center, an upscale shopping and 
condominium complex at the heart of Makati City.132  Among their demands were 
the resignation of President Macapagal-Arroyo, the Secretary of National 
Defense Angelo Reyes, and Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) General Victor Corpus.  They also wanted a 
forum to express their grievances against the government and the military 
establishment.  After 22 hours of siege, the mutiny ended peacefully as the 
perpetrators, widely known as the “Magdalo Group,” surrendered to government 
negotiators without a single shot fired or any damage to property (see Appendix 
for timeline).  The incident, however, not only challenged the legitimacy of the 
current regime but also left many questions about the condition of civil-military 
affairs in the country amid complaints of widespread corruption in the 
government including the military.  Since then, very grim systemic problems 
beneath the surface have been exposed that would require a complete overhaul 
of certain civilian and military institutions to prevent a total collapse.  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the failed mutiny and present a 
comparative analysis with coup attempts in the 1980s.  What were the underlying 
reasons behind this latest military mutiny?  Why did it fail and what was the 
Philippine government’s response?  More importantly, this chapter presents the 
lessons learned and discusses the implications on military professionalism and 
civil-military relations in the country.  Using the same lessons learned, this 
chapter also identifies areas where the US can possibly exert more influence to 
assist the Philippines in averting future coup attempts. 
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Except for the usual voices of political opposition, this is by far the most 
serious challenge involving the military to President Macapagal-Arroyo’s 
administration.  Since the country’s democratic consolidation following the 
demise of then President Marcos in 1986, the Philippines has experienced 
several instances of military intervention in political affairs.  This brings into 
question the professionalism in the AFP and the critical role of institutions that 
are supposed to uphold democracy.  This chapter suggests that professionalism, 
or the lack thereof, is not an independent variable that determines whether or not 
the military will intervene in political affairs.  Instead, it is a combination of strong 
civilian institutions, an effective and efficient military institution, solid oversight 
mechanisms, and highly professional armed forces that will preclude military 
adventurism and keep soldiers in the barracks. 
 
B.   THE MAKING OF A COUP:  THE ROOT CAUSES AND 
PROVOCATIONS 
Before the events of 27 July 2003, the rumors of a coup had been 
circulating for quite some time.  According to the independent Fact Finding 
Commission (also known as the Feliciano Commission) report, by the latter part 
of 2002 there had been reports of some military personnel expressing grievances 
and discontent as well as verified reports of secret meetings attended by junior 
officers in various parts of the country.133  Clearly, the grievances aired by the 
Magdalo Group are not something new but issues that continue to resurface in 
the military.  In October 2002, a news article in INQ7.net detailed consternation in 
the military over the Base Pay Increase Law or the Republic Act 9166 signed by 
Macapagal-Arroyo in June 2002.134 This pay increase had been proposed in 
1987.  This was also a complaint raised by rebel soldiers in 1987 and 1989 when 
coup attempts were launched against President Aquino.135  The grievances 
expressed by the group included problems in the Armed Forces Retirement and 
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Separation Benefits System (RSBS), the AFP procurement system, the 
unauthorized transfer or selling of arms and ammunition, and other concerns that 
undermined the morale and welfare of AFP personnel.  Some of these 
grievances were well-founded and complex and require not only institutional 
changes but also deliberate and immediate attention. 
The Feliciano Commission’s in-depth investigation revealed five major root 
causes of this recent military adventurism.  The first was “The politicization of the 
military amid the erosion of civilian political institutions that had oversight powers 
over the military.”136  This same condition existed in the Marcos regime when the 
AFP was subjected to political roles in national development efforts during the 
“new society” movement.  During martial law, junior officers “were invested with 
civil powers that inclined them toward political activism.”137  McCoy adds that as 
these young officers grew disillusioned because of corruption they “formed new 
political alliances and moved gradually toward revolt.”138  Likewise, the rebels of 
2003 were disenchanted with, among other institutional problems, the 
government’s overall inefficiency to solve corruption. This was exploited by a 
certain politicos to advance their agenda by creating an alliance with the Magdalo 
Group. 
Secondly, the government failed to enforce the law and therefore deprived 
“the law of its power to deter.”139  This refers specifically to the government’s 
failure to prosecute those involved in previous coup attempts and then granting 
them “unconditional amnesty in 1995.”140  At that time, the government was 
using the strategy of appeasement to satisfy the interests of the officer corps in 
order to discourage them from intervening in politics.141  Most of those involved 
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were absorbed back into the system and continued their military service.  Some, 
including Victor Corpus who was promoted to Brigadier General and served as 
Chief of the ISAFP, even reached leadership positions.  The prominent leader of 
those coup attempts, then Colonel Honasan, was never prosecuted and later 
was elected to the Philippine Senate. 
A third root cause cited by the Commission was the AFP’s key role in the 
fight against the communist insurgency and Moro secessionism which “creates 
civilian Government dependence upon the military.”142  According to MG Efren 
Abu, the Deputy Commanding General for the Philippine Army, this is precisely 
the reason the AFP cannot be divorced from politics, namely, these problems are 
political in nature.143  The role of soldiers in these missions is two-fold: to fight 
insurgents and to conduct civil-military operations through development and 
consolidation tasks.  The result is the strengthening of the AFP’s political power 
and the exacerbation of military politicization. 
Another major cause of the mutiny was attributed to “power grabs” in 
which civilian elites and politicians solicit military support to feed their personal 
and political ambitions.144  This was the case during the two “people power” 
revolutions, also known as EDSA I and EDSA II, when the military shifted its 
support away from the incumbent regimes to the Corazon Aquino and 
Macapagal-Arroyo, respectively.  As a result, the AFP gained much political 
leverage because of certain political elites’ reliance on military backing for their 
political survival.145  The investigations suggest that equipment and other 
paraphernalia used during the July 2003 mutiny cost a substantial amount of 
money which suggested monetary support from certain key civilian key figures, 
including deposed President Estrada.  Furthermore, reference to Senator 
Honasan’s “National Recovery Program” (NRP) by the rebel soldiers as the sole 
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solution to their grievances also suggests his involvement in the mutiny.146  The 
NRP which addresses various issues such as peace and order, the economy, 
poverty, and corruption, was Honasan’s political platform in his bid for the 
presidency.  The same Senator, who was once also a rebel soldier, was also 
implicated as having served as “adviser” to the group during some meetings and 
presided over a “blood compact” ritual with junior officers on 4 June 2003.147  In 
one of these meetings, Honasan also discussed “The Last Revolution,” a 
document that emphasized “the use of force, violence, or armed struggle” to 
achieve the NRP platform because incumbent officials are unwilling to relinquish 
their positions.148 
Finally, the Commission cites that “officers and troops under diligent and 
respected commanding officers did not join … suggesting the critical role played 
by this breed of military leaders in dealing with the coup virus.”149  Considering 
the number of officers involved, they represent a very small percentage of the 
officers in the AFP and this indicates nonsupport from the majority of officers.  
While many members of the military recognized the legitimacy of the grievances, 
they disagreed with the method used by the Magdalo Group.  Some of the 
enlisted members who participated in the mutiny claimed they were not even 
aware of the reason behind their involvement, except to follow the orders of their 
leaders.  Like the coup attempts in the 1980s, the greater majority of officers did 
not subscribe to seizing state power.  Instead, they were firmly grounded in the 
belief in civil supremacy and military professionalism.  McCoy credits the 
Philippine Military Academy for effectively “instilling values of professionalism in a 
majority of its regular officers.”150 
A key finding by the Commission is “that the mutiny had been planned and 
was not spontaneous and that it was part of a larger plan to achieve political 
                                            
146 Ibid., p. 127. 
147 Ibid., p. 4. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid., p. 134. 
150 McCoy, p. 348. 
47 
change by military force.”151  The Commission underscored the finding that while 
some of the grievances were founded, “the real impetus for the rebellion, the 
operative goal of the Magdalo group, was to seize power by force and implement 
Honasan’s NRP.”152  The plan sought to establish a 15-member council after a 
three-day restoration of deposed President Estrada.  Because the plot was 
preempted by the government, the group was forced to launch the mutiny after 
having failed to attain force requirements.153 
 
C.   THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE 
Intelligence data gathering weeks before 27 July seemed to be more than 
adequate to forewarn the Macapagal-Arroyo government of an impending coup.  
Sparking speculations of a coup plot, frequent meetings attended by junior 
officers had been under surveillance since the beginning of July.  The President 
also met with senior AFP officials who apparently have been approached by 
young AFP officers.  Reported “restiveness” among junior officers was not taken 
lightly by the administration.  For instance, AFP Chief of Staff Narciso Abaya was 
ordered on 18 July to “attend immediately to the grievances of the group.”154  To 
address the complaints, the President also ordered the institutionalization of a 
“grievance mechanism” in order to “strengthen a culture of disciplined 
transparency in the Armed Forces … and insulate uniform from politics, avoid 
factionalism and promote professionalism.”155 
On 22 July, amid coup rumors and reports of suspicious troop movements 
from various military units, particularly Scout Rangers and Naval personnel from 
the South, AFP Headquarters at Camp Aguinaldo, declared a red alert.  The 
following day, the Macapagal-Arroyo hosted a dinner at the palace for 
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“grumbling” members of PMA classes ’94 and ’95.  This was anticipated as an 
opportunity for the junior officers to have a dialogue with the President. 156  
However, this did not occur.  The non-dialogue apparently further frustrated and 
provoked the griping officers.  In an attempt to pacify the soldiers, the President 
made quick visits to a few units near Metro Manila over the next two days and 
declared that the military tension was over. 
In a surprising announcement on 25 July, Macapagal-Arroyo told a group 
of civil society leaders gathered at the EDSA Shrine for a thanksgiving mass that 
“there will be a coup attempt over the weekend.”157 The following day, ISAFP 
Chief BG Victor Corpus briefed civil society groups on the startling details about 
the impending coup, which was also aimed at embarrassing Macapagal-Arroyo 
during her State-of-the-Nation Address scheduled on 28 July.  The government’s 
discovery and preemption significantly impacted the coup planning. This 
prevented the Magdalo group from mustering their necessary force requirements 
and anticipated civilian support.  Later that evening, the President ordered the 
hunt of up to 60 officers and men involved in a plot to overthrow the 
government.158 
The events that transpired before and during the siege presented a 
calibrated response by government authorities, including the AFP and PNP 
forces.  The government’s coordinated efforts displayed the military leadership’s 
full support of the Macapagal-Arroyo’s regime.  The government’s negotiation 
team included retired AFP Chief of Staff General Roy Cimatu and two former 
putschists in 1989 (Scout Ranger Commander and West Point graduate, COL 
Danilo Lim and Undersecretary for Special Concerns, Abraham Purugganan).  
The Commission, however, determined that authorities failed to prevent the rebel 
troops from occupying Oakwood despite intelligence reports.  Moreover, 
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prematurely committing government troops in the area, they possibly exposed 
other hard targets that were more crucial to the government’s survival.159 
Immediately after the peaceful surrender of the mutinous soldiers, the AFP 
announced the creation of a special military task force to determine the cases to 
be filed or to commence court martial proceedings against the officers involved.  
During her State of the Nation Address on 28 Jul 03, Macapagal-Arroyo 
announced the creation of an independent commission to examine the renegade 
soldiers’ allegation that defense and military officials were behind the Davao City 
bombings and a second fact finding body, later named the “Feliciano 
Commission,” to “investigate the roots of the mutiny and the provocations that 
inspired it.”160 
 
D.   GRIEVANCES EXAMINED 
The following is a brief synopsis of some of the grievances expressed by 
the Magdalo group and the findings of the Feliciano Commission.  For this case 
study, the discussion is limited to the complaints involving the RSBS, the AFP 
Procurement System, and the funding and consequential problems related to the 
AFP Modernization Program.  Also outlined are the Commission’s recommend-
dations for the government or the AFP to rectify the problems.161 
(1)  The Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System 
(RSBS):  Intended as a retirement and separation benefit system for the AFP, 
the RSBS was established on 30 December 1973 under Presidential Decree No. 
361 and funded from congressional appropriations, mandatory contributions from 
AFP members, and tax-exempt earnings from the same fund.  Since its 
establishment, however, the system has never been discharged as originally 
mandated to serve as a true pension system.  Because of gross mismanagement 
which amount to criminal conduct, the system has experienced massive losses.  
d by the Commission is that retirement benefits paid Among the anomalies foun                                            
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to AFP military personnel have been made from regular annual appropriations 
instead of the “perpetual self-sufficient” RSBS. This problem was never 
addressed by the defense bureaucracy or Congress.  Structurally flawed, the 
system’s investment decisions are made by the AFP Chief of Staff and the 
Secretary of National Defense instead of by private investment professionals.  
The Commission’s recommendations are as follows: 
• Liquidate the present RSBS system 
• Return the soldiers’ RSBS contributions 
• Initiate an AFP Service and Insurance System 
• Implement fully the recommendations of the Senate Blue Ribbon 
Committee including the prosecution of certain individuals involved in 
RSBS-related criminal conduct. 
 
(2) The AFP Procurement System:  Problems in the military’s procure-
ment system have been a focus of corruption complaints not only by the Magdalo 
group but also by many members of the military including some in senior 
leadership.  The system itself institutionalized the problem of corruption to a point 
where, according the retired Flag-Officer-in-Command Rear Admiral Guillermo 
Wong, military officers in certain positions within the system are “robbing the 
people blind.”162  Wong exposed some of these anomalies in 2001 and it cost 
him his job and his possible appointment to the top position in the AFP.   
The Commission cited a number of practices that demonstrate 
institutionalized corruption, a few are mentioned below.  One practice is called 
“conversion” wherein allocated funds are transformed into cash short-circuiting or 
disregarding the procurement process.  While some commanders may use 
“converted” cash to procure much needed but unfunded items, others resort to 
pocketing the cash.  The supplier, with a false proof of delivery, receives his “cut” 
by the reduced cost conversion estimated at 30% less than the actual cost of the 
“undelivered” item.   
A second practice that invites corruption is the way “Centrally Managed 
Funds” (CMF) and “Contingency Funds” are treated.  Although these funds may 
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provide commanders with some flexibility, the lack of transparency and 
accountability results in personal financial gain for corrupt commanders.  A third 
practice that is closely related to “conversion” is called “washing.”  This refers to 
the “laundering” of “converted” funds for the benefit of another AFP unit.  The unit 
doing the washing receives a certain “laundering fee,” which is in addition to the 
monetary cost retained by the supplier for doing the paperwork.  Another practice 
that is inherent with the procurement system is “rigged bidding,” which 
encourages collusion between procurement officers and suppliers or contractors. 
Another complaint cited by the Commission and closely tied to the 
procurement system is the distribution of arms and ammunition as well as 
Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL). The AFP has acknowledged that it has 
limitations to properly monitor or account for these items.  The report indicates 
that despite numerous safeguards to ensure proper storage, distribution, and 
disposal of firearms and ammunition, some are lost or end up in the hands of the 
enemy.  With respect to POL products, “conversion” practice for a lower price is 
also a commander’s prerogative. 
The Commission’s recommendations addressing the procurement system 
are as follows: 
• Simplify the AFP procurement procedures to reduce the incentives 
for conversion and other forms of misappropriation of public funds 
• Control commanders’ discretionary powers over the CMF by 
making the requirements of transparency more stringent and 
increasing the accountability of commanders 
• Reduce the amount of CMF in the AFP General Headquarters and 
Service Headquarters by distributing more funds to the next lower 
echelon of command. 
• Strictly implement control measures over supplies and impose 
substantive penalties on service unit commanders who fail to 
enforce established policies. 
• Set tenure limits of two years for AFP finance and procurement 
officers. 
(3)  Modernizing the AFP:  Funding and Consequential Problems:  
The sad state of the modernization program has been nagging the AFP for many 
years as a result of severe funding limitations compounded by economic crises, 
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poor planning, and bad decisions.  The failure to modernize not only undermined 
the effectiveness of the AFP to perform its mission because of decrepit 
equipment or a lack of equipment but also seriously lowered the morale and 
welfare of the soldiers and their families due to critical problems in medical health 
service, housing, and other support requirements.   
The Magdalo group complained of retired generals who refuse to vacate 
residences that are intended for officers in active service.  The Commission 
investigated the housing complaint and found this is a complex problem that 
involves the sale of real estate in certain military camps in Metro Manila.  A 
percentage of the proceeds was originally intended to help fund the AFP’s 
modernization program.  This report also found ownership litigations over some 
of the housing areas in question and the government’s failure to recover some of 
the properties that were improperly acquired.  To rectify these problems and re-
channel the money from real-estate sales to the AFP’s modernization, the 
Commission recommends the following: 
• Vigorously pursue recovery of the former Joint U.S. Military Advisory 
Group (JUSMAG) and Navy Officers Village Association, Inc. (NOVAI) 
properties using the most competent lawyers that the government 
agencies can deploy.  Further, if falsification of public instruments was 
involved in litigations, initiate appropriate criminal proceedings. 
 
• Pursue recovery of the “squatted” land in Fort Bonifacio from civilian 
and military squatters by all lawful means, including the use of force if 
necessary. 
 
• Substantially increase the AFP’s share in Fort Bonifacio’s sale 
proceeds to be allocated to the AFP Modernization Program. 
 
• Reinforce the Office of the Ombudsman by increasing funding and 
other support enabling the Office to function independently and 
vigorously as the government’s principal prosecution arm to prosecute 
corrupt public officials, even high-ranking officials in the AFP. 
 
E.   A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
Using Juan Linz’s analytical framework of the breakdown of democratic 
regimes, the Philippine experience provides a unique case study to explain the 
breakdown process.  What were the factors that contributed to the mutiny and 
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near collapse of the Macapagal-Arroyo regime?  Linz introduces the concepts of 
legitimacy, efficacy, and effectiveness as described below: 
 
At the very least, legitimacy is the belief that in spite of short-
comings and failures, the existing political institutions are better 
than any others that might be established, and that they therefore 
can demand obedience … More specifically, the legitimacy of a 
democratic regime rests on the belief in the right of those legally 
elevated to authority to issue certain types of commands, to expect 
obedience, and to enforce them, if necessary, by the use of 
force.163 
 
Efficacy refers to the capacity of a regime to find solutions to the 
basic problems facing any political system (and those that become 
salient in any historical moment) that are perceived as more 
satisfactory than unsatisfactory by aware citizens… the efficacy of a 
regime is judged not by the actions of a particular government over 
a short span of time, but as the sum of its actions over a longer 
period of time.164 
 
Effectiveness is the capacity actually to implement the policies 
formulated, with the desired results.  The fact that even the best 
laws are worthless if unenforceable falls within this concept.165 
 
Linz argues that democratic legitimacy requires the majority of voting 
citizens and those in power to abide by the rule of law and at the same time the 
citizenry must trust those in power to uphold the same rules.166  He adds that 
efficacy and effectiveness over time “can strengthen, reinforce, maintain, or 
weaken the belief of legitimacy.”167  Legitimacy, efficacy, and effectiveness have 
a non-lineal relationship.  Thus, the stability and performance of the regime 
increases when the values of the relations among the three variables are more 
positive.168  Applying these concepts, Linz presents the breakdown of democracy 
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as a process that is not inevitable but begins with the basic supposition that 
political actors make decisions, as they are presented with choices, that affect 
the probability of regime survival.  Depicted in Figure 2 below, Maria Rasmussen 
summarizes Linz’s breakdown process whereby politicians have fewer options as 
the crisis worsens (as the process moves from left to right). 
 
 
Figure 2. Linz’s Breakdown of Democratic Regimes169 
 
The events surrounding this latest mutiny demonstrate the emergence of 
certain political actors who may be characterized as being disloyal or semi-loyal 
opposition and who have courted the junior officers to challenge the legitimacy of 
the government.  The grievances aired by the Magdalo group served as 
“evidence” of the regime’s lack of efficacy and ineffectiveness.  As discussed 
above, the root causes of the mutiny are systemic in nature and indicate 
weaknesses in both civilian and military institutions.  For instance, the lack of a 
solid civilian oversight mechanism over military affairs has eroded the regime’s 
efficacy and reinforced the disloyal or semi-loyal opposition’s claim of the 
government’s inability to fix the problems that are gnawing at the foundations of 
the AFP.  Moreover, the failure of the government to enforce the law in the past 
reflects the ineffectiveness of the judicial system as an institution. 
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Within the military establishment, the gross mismanagement of the RSBS 
and widespread corruption due to systemic problems such as the AFP 
procurement system have undermined the effectiveness the AFP.  Consequently, 
the morale and welfare of personnel have suffered.  These unsolvable problems 
have been exploited by disloyal and semi-loyal opposition to court a faction of the 
military to challenge the legitimacy of the Macapagal-Arroyo regime.  
Consequently, politicization increased for the group of idealistic junior officers 
who were partly enticed by Senator Honasan and his National Recovery 
Program.  
In the July 2003 failed mutiny, the government’s preemption of the coup 
plot averted potentially widespread political violence.  If the Magdalo Group had 
been able to meet its force requirements, they could have attacked or secured 
critical hard targets and destabilized the government.  Unlike the turnout in EDSA 
I and EDSA II people power revolutions, the Magdalo Group failed to rally mass 
support despite deliberate efforts by “anti-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo” 
groups to recruit civilians to join the coup.  On the contrary, the key elements of 
civil society including the Roman Catholic Church’s Cardinal Sin and former 
President Aquino fully supported the Macapagal-Arroyo government.  Moreover, 
although many understood the legitimacy of their grievances, they did not gain 
support from senior leaders in the military. 
In Linz’s model of the breakdown of democratic regimes, a loss of power 
and a power vacuum follows the crisis.  This model held true during the EDSA I 
and EDSA II people power revolutions, but it was not the case for this failed 
mutiny.  Benefiting from the full support of the AFP’s leadership, President 
Macapagal-Arroyo maintained her role as chief executive.  The regime’s 
legitimacy remained intact and there was no loss of power, no power vacuum, 
nor a transfer of power.  Instead, there was reequilibration after the peaceful 
surrender of the rebel soldiers.  Linz define’s reequilibration of a democracy as “a 
political process that, after a crisis that has seriously threatened the continuity 
and stability of the basic democratic political mechanisms, results in their 
continued existence at the same or higher levels of democratic legitimacy, 
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efficacy, and effectiveness.170  Modifying Linz’s model, the July 2003 failed 
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Figure 3. July 2003 Failed Mutiny and Reequilibration 
 
In this case study, at least three conditions made reequilibration possible.  
First, the regime was able to convince the Magdalo group leaders that their 
grievances and other complaints would be addressed.  The government 
negotiator’s success in striking an agreement with the young officers resulted in a 
peaceful return to the barracks and paved the way for the creation of an 
independent fact-finding commission.  Secondly, despite the negotiating team’s 
failure to cite the applicability of “the law punishing coup d’etat as an offense 
cognizable by the civilian courts,” the leaders of the Magdalo group agreed that 
they bore the full consequences of their actions while their followers would be 
prosecuted under the provisions of Article 105 of the Articles of War.171  Lastly, 
the failure of the mutiny and the resulting return to the barracks did not cause the 
disloyal and semi-loyal opposition to continue their challenge to the regime’s 
legitimacy.  This is significant because even after the peaceful surrender of the 
rebel soldiers who occupied Oakwood, the existence of a residual force of 
turncoats remains a legitimate concern for the government. 
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Sustaining reequilibration depends greatly on the government’s future 
success and political will to institute the recommendations made by the Feliciano 
Commission.  Much of the grievances aired during this mutiny are a direct result 
of the government’s failure to follow-up on the Davide Commission’s 
recommendations in 1990.  The government is still in a precarious situation and a 
mishandling of this situation will set the country back to an unsolvable problem.  
The 2003 Feliciano Commission warned that its recommendations not be 
neglected and shelved but stressed the necessity for a follow-up mechanism.  
The Commission implored that “one official of high competence, commitment and 
integrity, with direct access to the President and enjoying the trust of all political 
groupings, be designated with all dispatch, on a full time basis, with the task of 
implementing the recommendations.”172 
The Commission notes that this mutiny is the first in the country’s history 
to be led by junior officers, which suggests three concerns:  (1)  a breakdown in 
the chain of command, (2)  alienation of the Magdalo group from their senior 
officers, a sentiment that may be shared by other junior officers in the AFP, and 
(3)  a general decline of professionalism in the AFP officer corps.173  But was it 
really a result of a decline in military professionalism or a breakdown in the chain 
of command?  The lessons learned in the July 2003 mutiny suggests that 
although there may have been a lapse of professionalism among the junior 
officers involved, by and large, the crisis was a product of weak civilian and 
military institutions. 
Redefining the traditional Huntingtonian principle of “subjective” and 
“objective” civilian control over the armed forces, Trinkunas introduces two 
dimensions of a strong democratic civilian control:  the combination of institution-
alized oversight of armed forces activities and military professionalization.174  His 
argument proposes that in order to have civilian control, politicians and 
bureaucrats must be able to “determine defense policies and approve military 
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activities through an institutionalized defense bureaucracy.”175  Trinkunas also 
posits two concepts that are essential in crafting civilian control: 
 
Regime Leverage is “affected by the opportunity structure that 
accompanies a transition and the civilian strategy that allows 
democratizers to compel the armed forces to accept reduced 
jurisdictional boundaries following a dictatorship.”176 
 
Regime capacity is the “combination of government attention, 
resources, and trained personnel focused on defense issues,” 
which allows democratizers to institutionalize civilian control.177 
 
Following the country’s democratic consolidation after the ouster of the 
Marcos dictatorship, regime leverage was attained largely through appeasement 
strategies aimed at satisfying the interests of certain senior-level officers in the 
AFP.  Some of these strategies, such as short-term appointments of retiring 
generals to the AFP Chief of Staff post or the appointment ex-AFP Chief of Staffs 
as Secretary of National Defense, might have backfired contributing to the 
regime’s inability to rid the military of widespread graft and corruption.  As 
demonstrated by the findings of the Feliciano Commission, regime capacity was 
undermined due to weak institutions in the defense bureaucracy. It may be 
argued therefore that despite the professionalism of the majority of the AFP 
officer corps, military intervention occurred because the government lacked the 
capacity to oversee and monitor military activities effectively.  Observing this 
institutional weakness, Colonel Morales declares, “The Oakwood incident is only 
one outward sign of a fundamental and long-running flaw within the AFP.  These 
flaws have been gnawing away at the foundations of the AFP and if left 
uncorrected will certainly result in a sudden and catastrophic collapse.”178 
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In the final analysis, the July 2003 failed mutiny does not provide an 
accurate assessment on the state of professionalism in the AFP.  It appears that 
only a small minority in the officer corps have succumbed, as in past coup 
attempts, to politicization through political patronage.  What it exposed, however, 
are numerous institutional deficiencies, both within the civilian government and 
the defense bureaucracy, which eroded regime capacity.  These loopholes 
presented easy opportunities for corrupt military officials to enrich themselves.  
This culture of corruption directly impacts the effectiveness of the military and 
generates disillusionment within the rank and file.  Government attention was 
also lacking in the prosecution of criminal acts thereby losing its power to deter.  
In turn, certain semi-loyal or disloyal political opposition groups have exploited 
the weaknesses in institutions to advance their political goals.  Therefore, it is the 
combination of strong civilian institutions, an effective and efficient military 
institution, solid oversight mechanisms, and highly professional armed forces that 
will preclude military interventions. 
For the most part, the US has done a tremendous job of enhancing 
military professionalism through various areas of influence as discussed in this 
thesis.  Military professionalism alone, however, does not prevent military 
adventurism if democratic institutions are weak.  The US can exert a more 
positive influence by focusing on other programs that are geared toward 




In the past century, the relationship between the Philippines and the 
United States remained intact.   The US certainly, directly or indirectly, 
contributed to the military professionalism in the Philippines.  In tracing this 
relationship, it appears that the US always had its hand, visible or invisible, in 
influencing Philippine political, economic, and military affairs because of its 
interests in the region.   In this “special relationship,” the most powerful 
stakeholder in the security of the Philippine state has been its American 
patron.”179   
The US has left an indelible imprint, positive or negative, in military 
professionalism in the Armed Forces of the Philippines.  Beyond the West Point-
style uniforms cadets wear, the Philippine Military Academy as originally 
envisioned by General MacArthur continues to produce professional leaders in 
the AFP.   Service academies in the US certainly produced graduates who 
became key leaders in the history of the Philippines.   Additional research tracing 
the careers Filipino graduates at US service academies may present a better 
picture on this area of US influence.  Training through IMET continues to be an 
essential element in shaping the professionalism of Philippine officers.  Even 
though the 1994 IMET case study on the Philippines reflects disturbing 
observations, consideration must be given to the fact that a sizeable portion of 
officers who served during the Marcos regime still remain in the AFP, some of 
whom may be in leadership positions.  Furthermore, because of the persistent 
budget deficiencies in the AFP, modernization of equipment will continue to lag 
behind the training that many officers receive through the program.   The AFP will 
continue to be challenged with its internal and external security concerns, yet the 
existing bilateral security and defense arrangements with the US will continue to 
play a significant role to meet these challenges.  
The end of the cold war, the withdrawal of the US bases, and the global 
war on terrorism changed the Philippine security environment.  This presents 
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major challenges for the AFP as it confronts this new and evolving environment.  
The end of the Cold War certainly diminished external threats; however, the 
armed forces have absorbed the primary responsibility of defending the territory 
from external aggression, a de facto role the US forces have assumed during 
their presence.  With limited resources, the AFP must now also focus on the 
increased insurgencies.  Terrorism also presents a different challenge for the 
AFP because of its global nature.  The AFP stands to benefit a lot in terms of 
security assistance and increased joint US-Philippines military exercises.  The 
elevation of the Philippines to a Major Non-NATO Ally presents another 
opportunity for the AFP as it stands to gain more access to American defense 
equipment and supplies.  This also provides the two countries with an opportunity 
to cooperate in research and development. 
The framework of the postmodern military is not really a new concept to 
the AFP because it was already involved in non-traditional roles, including 
international peace operations, since its mandate was established.  Its 
involvement in national development through Civil Military Operations impacts 
military professionalism because it narrows the gap between the military and the 
civilian sector and creates a mindset that they are not apart from society.  The 
Revolution in Military Affairs is another challenge that confronts the AFP as it 
faces the 21st Century.  It will directly impact future strategies, military doctrine, 
training, education, organization, equipment, operations, and tactics for the AFP 
to achieve its future objectives. 
Even as the July 2003 mutiny presented a serious challenge to the 
legitimacy of the Macapagal-Arroyo regime, the mutiny created an opportunity for 
the government and the military establishment to evaluate the shortcomings of 
the defense bureaucracy and its implications on civil-military relations.  While the 
experience demonstrated a lapse of military professionalism for a small sector in 
the AFP, it also exposed the continuing attempts of certain disloyal or semi-loyal 
politicos to court certain factions in the military to pursue their ambitions.  To 
reemphasize the Commission’s finding, “the real impetus for the rebellion, the 
operative goal of the Magdalo group, was to seize power by force and implement 
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Honasan’s NRP.” These power grabs will continue to haunt the AFP as long as 
there are institutional problems that continue to undermine the morale of soldiers. 
The mutiny itself is also a manifestation of a deep-rooted and enduring 
institutional problem.  It amplified the problem of corruption the AFP leadership 
has long ignored or brushed aside.  Junior officers witnessed corruption among 
their leaders.  As in the past, officers implicated in corrupt practices go 
unpunished.  Allowing corruption to continue unabated is a failure in leadership, 
which breeds incompetence, contributes to ineffectiveness, and perpetuates a 
culture of greed in the AFP.  What is alarming by the examples given in the 
Commission’s report is not only the amount of money involved in these 
transactions, which sometimes exceed one million US dollars, but also the extent 
to which these anomalies occur within the AFP.  If this is just the tip of the 
iceberg, the enormity of this institutional problem can very seriously damage the 
country.  As the Commission warns, “The tragedy is that such a failure of the 
military organization would almost certainly push the Republic itself to the brink of 
disaster.”180 
As revealed by the Feliciano Commission, there is also a failure of the 
judicial arm of the government to prosecute, including high-ranking officials in the 
AFP (retired or active) who were involved in criminal acts.  If the government is to 
have an effective oversight mechanism, it must be able to, through the Office of 
the Ombudsman and by the full-force of the law, investigate and prosecute even 
high-ranking officers in the AFP.  The government also lacked the capacity to 
discharge the law effectively to expel illegal “squatters” who are occupying 
property intended for military personnel.  These failures demonstrate the 
weakened state of government institutions particularly that of law enforcement. 
The lack of military professionalism alone, therefore, is not the sole 
determinant that caused this latest military intervention in civilian affairs.  The 
crisis was brought about by a combination of the lack strong civilian institutions 
that provide solid oversight and control mechanism, ineffective and inefficient 
military institutions that continue to dampen soldier morale, and a few 
                                            
180 The Report of the Fact Finding Commission, p. 69. 
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unprofessional officers courted by a political faction.  As the country looks 
forward to the Presidential elections in May 2004, the government can ill afford to 
ignore the recommendations by the Feliciano Commission.  Failure to rectify the 
problems through immediate and deliberate institutional reforms can only lead to 
more military adventurism. 
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APPENDIX.  JULY 2003 FAILED MUTINY TIMELINE181 
 
18 July Inquirer and INQ7.net report on restive junior officers, mostly 
from PMA Class ’95.  President Macapagal-Arroyo orders the 
AFP Chief of Staff Gen Abaya to investigate their complaints. 
19 July The Inquirer reports that the junior officers had been seeking 
the advice of Senator Gringo Honasan and their their “bible” 
was the senator’s National Recovery Program platform. 
22 July INQ7.net reports that 15 members of the Scout Rangers and 
two Naval personnel were held by authorities in Iloilo; Camp 
Aguinaldo declares a red alert amid rumors about an impending 
coup. 
23 July The President hosts dinner for the junior officers and dismisses 
coup rumors. 
24 July The President leads the turn-over ceremonies at the First Scout 
Rangers Regiment in Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan and 
joins in the traditional “boodle fight” with soldiers. 
25 July The President makes quick visits to the Marines’ training center 
in Ternate, Cavite; the 15th Strike Wing of the Philippine Air 
Force in Sangley Point, Cavite, and the Cavite Naval Base in 
Cavite City, and declares the “military restiveness is over.” 
 Later that afternoon, the President tells civil society groups at 
the EDSA Shrine that there would be a coup “this weekend.” 
26 July Ten suspected leaders declared unaccounted for by the AFP 
 5 A.M.:  Emergency meetings held by Abaya, National Security 
Adviser Golez with general staff and senior officers 
  Around 10 A.M.:  ISAFP Chief BG Victor Corpus briefs Cardinal 
Sin and civil society groups on coup scenarios.  The civil society 
groups set up command center at the EDSA Shrine.  The 
President calls an emergency meeting of the Cabinet and the 
AFP and Philippine National Police (PNP) top brass. 
 12:00 Noon:  PNP Chief Ebdane effects full alert status 
nationwide as a contingency measure.  All PNP field 
commanders were directed to secure vital installations and key 
establishments. 
 7 P.M.:  Task Force Libra (TF Libra), the counter-coup 
composite unit of the AFP, commanded by MG Efren Abu, was 
at full strength. 
 8 P.M.:  The President issues her first statement that a band of 
soldiers had abandoned their posts.  She orders a hunt for 
rogue junior officers, saying they would be court-martialed.  She 
                                            
181 Sources:  The Report of the Fact Finding Commission and Inquirer News Service, 
<http://www.inq7.net/nat/2003/jul/28/test/nat_10-1-p.htm> (1 Aug 03). 
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also warned “unscrupulous politicians” not to exploit the 
situation.   
27 July 1 A.M.:  The President wraps up meeting with key Cabinet 
officials in Malacanang. 
 1 A.M.:  Over 300 rebel soldiers quietly enter the premises of 
Ayala Center in several groups and plant powerful bombs in 
parts of Glorietta in Makati City, storm the mall’s basement 
parking area, and occupy the Oakwood Premier.  The rebel 
soldiers wear red arm bands.  Another band of soldiers with red 
arm bands is spotted trooping out of Fort Bonifacio.  Security 
guards in the Ayala Center are helpless as rebel soldiers in full 
battle gear seize their service firearms and order them to leave 
the premises. 
 Two government command groups dispatched to Makati.  
Marines and Army officers later joined PNP at Makati.  Marines 
under Teodosio prepositioned around the car park behind 
Oakwood. 
 Around 2 A.M.:  Joint Operation Center in Camp Aguinaldo 
receives report of troops moving from Metro Manila from 
Ternate, Cavite.  Armed soldiers wearing red armbands seen 
crossing EDSA and moving toward the Ayala Center. 
 Around 3 A.M.:  The President meets with the AFP top brass 
and key Cabinet officials.  Troops securing Malacanang, 
particularly the Presidential Security Group, wrap blue bands 
around their arms. 
 3:20 A.M.:  The rebels’ “perimeter security” in the Ayala Center 
is in place, and an officer issues a threat to set off the 
explosives should government troops attack. 
 Around 3:30 A.M.:  Some motorists and late-night shoppers 
finally realize something unusual.  Rebel soldiers direct traffic 
and keep dumbfounded motorists out of the area.  A closed van 
fails to notice the restrictions, drives straight into the area, and 
runs over a sign post erected by the rebels.  A rebel soldier fires 
a warning shot. 
 4 A.M.:  Task Force Ayala (TF Ayala) of the Marine Corps 
activated and occupied positions with infantry and armor, 
encircling Ayala Center Complex. 
 Around 4:30 A.M.:  The rebel officers issue a three-page 
statement, detailing their accusations against the Macapagal-
Arroyo administration. 
 Sunrise:  Tension remains high, with rebels already firmly in 
place.  At least two snipers can be seen atop Oakwood. 
 Around 8 A.M.:  Malacanang begins a marathon press briefing 
aired live on TV, with more than 50 politicians, including 
senators, congressmen and mayors, taking turns expressing 
support for the President and appealing to the junior officers to 
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lay down their arms. 
 9 A.M.:  The President issues her second statement, giving the 
mutinous soldiers up to 5 P.M. on Sunday to surrender or be 
removed by force. 
 Around 9:40 A.M.:  Deposed President Joseph Estrada is 
transferred from the Veterans Memorial Medical Center 
(VMMC)– a precautionary measure, the Palace explained some 
two hours later. 
 10 A.M.:  Navy LTSG Antonio Trillanes, the leader of the 
renegade soldiers, says they are not negotiating with the 
government.  He tells ABS-CBN in a phone interview from 
Oakwood the rebel officers do not expect to get a “proper 
forum” when “the President and the AFP leadership” are the 
object of their complaint. 
 1 P.M.:  The President issues Proclamation 47 declaring a state 
of rebellion.  She issues general Order No. 4 directing the AFP 
and the PNP to conduct the necessary measures to quell the 
rebellion. 
 Before 3 P.M.:  Estrada is transferred back to the VMMC. 
 Around 3 P.M.:  At least 10 rebel soldiers march out of 
Oakwood and return to the government fold. 
 Around 3:30 P.M.:  MGen Emmanuel Teodosio, Philippine 
Marine Corps Commandant, announces that about 50 rebel 
soldiers have already turned their backs on the mutineers and 
have rejoined the government. 
 Around 4:50 P.M.:  Rebel officers begin a chaotic press briefing, 
with Capt Milo Maestrecampo appealing for understanding.  
“Don’t judge us.  We are not terrorists.  Whatever may happen 
here, we can say we stood our ground.” 
 5 P.M.:  Before the President’s 5 P.M. deadline expires, 
Presidential spokesperson Ignacio Bunye announces that the 
deadline has been extended by two hours, to 7 P.M., citing late-
breaking developments relayed by General Roy Cimatu, who is 
negotiating with the rebels. 
 Around 5:20 P.M.:  Senator Gregorio Honasan arrives in 
Oakwood to talk to some of the rebel officers. 
 5:30 P.M.:  Authorities raid what they say is an operation center 
of the Madalo rebel group in Mandaluyong City. 
 Around 7:30 P.M.:  Palace extends deadline indefinitely, as 
negotiations led by Cimatu continue. 
 9:30 P.M.:  An agreement reached between government 
negotiators and the rebel group. 
 Around 9:50 P.M.:  In a Palace press briefing, a beaming 
President announces that, after several hours of negotiation, the 
day-old rebellion has been resolved.  She says the mutineers 
will be investigated and punished according to the law, and 
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civilian supporters will be charged.  In the same briefing, AFB 
Chief of Staff Abaya says:  “We have essentially quelled the 
rebellion.” 
 Around 10:10 P.M.:  Army Commanding General LTG Gregorio 
Camiling is set to bring the mutineers to Army Headquarters in 
Fort Bonifacio. 
 Just before midnight:  Last batch of mutineers arrive in Fort 
Bonifacio. 
28 July President’s State of the Nation Address (SONA) 
29 July Fact Finding Commission (Feliciano Commission) created 
under Administrative Order No. 78. 
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